When Wilhelm Dilthey distinguished between the natural sciences and the human sciences in the 1880s, he made a claim that product thinkers still haven't fully absorbed: explaining a mechanism and understanding a situation are two different cognitive acts. Explanation (Erklären) works by subsuming particulars under general laws — exactly what a mental model does. Understanding (Verstehen) works by entering the particulars until their inner logic reveals itself. The problem isn't that mental models are wrong. It's that they are explanation machines, and some of the most consequential product situations require understanding instead. When a user does something that 'doesn't make sense,' the model-wielder explains it away — cognitive bias, bad onboarding, edge case. The understander sits with it longer, treating the anomaly as meaningful rather than deviant. Dilthey's practical implication: maintain two distinct postures, and know which mode you're currently in. Explanation scales. Understanding reveals. You need both, and they cannot be performed simultaneously.

Call to mind a user behavior or team pattern you recently explained with a model. What would you notice if you treated it as meaningful rather than accounted for?

Drawing from German Hermeneutics / Philosophy of the Human Sciences — Wilhelm Dilthey (Introduction to the Human Sciences, 1883)