Most theological arguments for God's existence are really arguments about grammar — about what kind of thing God can be a subject of. Gottlob Frege, the philosopher-logician who built the foundations of modern formal logic, noticed that existence isn't a property of things the way 'red' or 'heavy' is. When you say 'God exists,' you aren't adding a feature to God the way you'd add a color to a chair. You're making a claim about whether a concept has any instances at all. This distinction, largely ignored in popular God-debates, quietly dismantles both naive theism and naive atheism: both sides are often arguing about whether a concept 'has existence as a property' — which Frege showed is a category error, like asking whether the number seven is heavier than six. What this opens up, practically, is a different kind of religious seriousness: one less invested in winning the existence argument and more interested in what it means to live *as though* a concept has weight in the world — which is, arguably, what worship has always actually been.

What would your relationship to your deepest convictions look like if you stopped treating them as claims about facts and started treating them as commitments about how to orient your life?

Drawing from Analytic Philosophy of Logic synthesized with Philosophy of Religion — Gottlob Frege