Every craft tradition draws a distinction between learning a skill and inhabiting it — but Jain epistemology makes this split unusually precise. The Jain concept of *naya* — partial standpoints, each capturing one true slice of a complex reality — suggests that expert knowledge is not a pyramid you climb toward a single summit, but a rotating lens system, where different framings reveal different truths about the same object. Applied to medicine: the biochemist's framing of a case, the patient's narrative framing, and the epidemiologist's population framing are not competing explanations jostling for dominance. They are each a *naya* — partial, valid, and irreducibly incomplete without the others. What Jain logicians called *anekāntavāda* — the doctrine of many-sidedness — wasn't relativism; it was a rigorous insistence that single-perspective certainty is always an epistemological error. The clinical implication is quietly demanding: the moment you feel a case is fully explained, you have likely committed to one *naya* and stopped rotating the lens. Today, pick the one framing of a problem — clinical, personal, systemic — you haven't yet turned toward.

In a case you closed recently — what framing did you never actually apply, and what might it have shown?

Drawing from Jain Epistemology (Anekāntavāda) — Mahāvīra and the Jain logical tradition (Syādvāda school)